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The long run welfare implications of the legal retirement age are studied in a perfect foresight
overlapping-generations model where agents live for two periods. Agents￿lifetime is divided between
working life and retirement by a legal retirement age controlled by the government whereas agents,
besides savings, control the intensive margin or "yearly" labour supply. The legal retirement age is
utilized to dampen distortionary e⁄ects of payroll taxes and public pension annuities and promote
capital accumulation. We show that a social optimal legal retirement age exists and how it depends
on whether payroll taxes or bene￿t annuities ensures budget balance of the PAYG pension system.
Keywords: Optimal legal retirement age, pay-as-you-go-pension systems, overlapping-
generations model.
11. INTRODUCTION
How should working hours be distributed throughout life? The legal retirement age
is an important aspect of answering this question, since generous public pension systems
discourage work beyond the legal retirement age. Therefore, the recently conducted pension
system reforms around most of Western Europe may have important implications for how
workers choose to allocate lifetime labour supply in the future. Even though the welfare
implications of the reforms are a major concern, alterations of the legal retirement age have
mainly been analysed in the context of budgetary concerns, whereas the direct impacts on
the life cycle and thereby welfare have attracted less attention.
This paper aims at clarifying the impacts on individual welfare caused by a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) system, particularly focusing on the role played by the legal retirement age. With
a long run perspective, this analysis has two aspects. On the one hand, the legal retirement
age directly a⁄ects welfare since it in￿ uences how many years workers stay in the workforce.
On the other hand, by determining the length of working life, the legal retirement age a⁄ects
the need for private savings. This is important for welfare in the long run, since savings,
causing capital accumulation, is essential for economic growth. This paper analyses these
e⁄ects in detail. In particular, an optimal design of a PAYG pension should feature a legal
retirement age that divides total life between working life and retirement in a way that takes
into account both lifecycle and capital accumulation e⁄ects on long run welfare.
We show that there exists a socially optimal legal retirement age where the lifetime utility
of the agents is maximised. This result is a consequence of two counteracting e⁄ects taking
place as the legal retirement age is altered. For example, an increased legal retirement age, in
itself, tends to increase lifetime labour supply and thereby income and savings. However, for
higher values of the retirement age, a further increase makes workers choose fewer working
hours per year, since they will ultimately work their whole lives. Therefore, for a su¢ ciently
high legal retirement age, lifetime labour supply and savings may be lowered by increasing
the legal retirement age. We will refer to these two counteracting e⁄ects as extensive and
intensive e⁄ects, respectively.
We ￿nd that the socially optimal legal retirement age depends on the other parts of
the PAYG pension system. If you change one of the three parts, to keep budget balance,
one or two of the other parts must be changed as well. Hence, the socially optimal legal
retirement age should be seen as one part of the optimal package. All three parts a⁄ect
workers￿decisions and are therefore distortionary by nature, since workers do not assign
the real costs and bene￿ts from leisure and savings in the presence of pay roll taxes and
2pension bene￿ts. In this paper, the legal retirement age is introduced as a policy instrument
with the potential to dampen such distortionary e⁄ects from the PAYG system. Under the
restriction of budget balance, an increased retirement age makes it possible, all things being
equal, to decrease yearly pay roll taxes and/or increase bene￿t annuities. Consequently,
pension system reforms have important long run welfare e⁄ects, not only by directly a⁄ecting
the length of working and retirement life, but also by changing the distortionary e⁄ects of
the pension system. Therefore, we suggest that the proportionality between the observed
increased longevity and the legal retirement age should depend on the other parts of the
reform. For example, if the yearly pay roll tax rate is decreased along with an increased
retirement age, we ￿nd less room for increasing the legal retirement age than if bene￿t
annuities were increased.
Regarding distortionary e⁄ects on savings, it is well known that PAYG pension systems
depress private saving and consequently capital accumulation (Samuelson, 1975). If you are
provided with public pensions each year in your retired life you need less private savings
for each year of your retired life. However, this is not the whole story of public pension
systems and private savings. As ￿rst pointed out by Feldstein (1974), there may be a
counteracting induced retirement e⁄ect. Public pension schemes also a⁄ect decisions via
the legal retirement age. For example, by decreasing the age at which workers become
eligible for public pensions, governments induce workers to retire earlier and thereby save
for a longer retirement period, which tends to increase private savings. Even though workers
have fewer years in which to save (the extensive e⁄ect), the increased propensity to save each
year (the intensive e⁄ect) could be dominating. Hence, the introduction of a PAYG system
where workers are eligible for (low) pension annuities su¢ ciently early would increase private
savings. These counteracting intensive and extensive e⁄ects are captured in our model.
Another implication of adjusting the legal retirement age is that workforce participation
is altered directly at the extensive margin, i.e. the number of years workers stay in the
workforce. The famed empirical studies by Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) show that the
legal retirement age constitutes a highly e⁄ective instrument for governments. As Gruber
and Wise (1998) put it, there is a strong correspondence between the age at which bene￿ts
are available and departure from the labour force. The conclusion is drawn from the success
of public programmes intending to lower the workforce participation of older workers. The
instrument was to provide public transfers at a lower age, intending to encourage earlier
retirement of old and disabled workers. The ambition was to decrease unemployment among
the remaining labour force. The reforms succeeded in lowering workforce participation of
older (disabled) workers, but unemployment rates did not fall as much as hoped for. Our
model reveals a simple relation that may be one of many possible explanations of this ￿nding.
3Indeed, people have to work for a certain number of hours during life to obtain a certain
consumption level during life. If social security systems encourage workers to retire earlier,
then workers choose to work more intensively during their shorter working life, to maintain
the same consumption level throughout life. Therefore, the intention of governments to
decrease the workforce (at the extensive margin) by the legal retirement age may imply
a non-negligible counteracting e⁄ect at the intensive margin. We believe this to be an
equally important point regarding pension system reforms where the legal retirement age is
increased.
The literature on retirement can be divided into two branches, the private retirement
decision, and retirement in general equilibrium models. What drives the private retirement
decision has been analysed for example by Sheshinksi (1978), Burbidge and Robb (1980)
and Cremer et al. (2004). These papers perceive retirement as the point in time where
agents prefer full time leisure, studied in a continuous time partial equilibrium framework
with agents choosing a stream of consumption and leisure throughout life. The general
￿nding is that agents retire when marginal utility from consuming net working income equals
marginal utility from full time leisure. More closely related to this paper are contributions
by Hu (1979) and Heijdra and Romp (2009) who study retirement in a general equilibrium
OLG framework. Hu (1979) examines the e⁄ect of increased pension on lifetime utility and
￿nds that increased pension level will increase the demand for leisure (earlier retirement) in
the short run, while the long run e⁄ect is ambiguous since decreased capital accumulation
a⁄ects factor prices. Optimal retirement in this analysis is then an outcome of a pension
level that balances the cost of increased static ine¢ ciency from higher pensions with bene￿ts
of decreased dynamic ine¢ ciency. By assuming a small open economy, Heijdra and Romp
(2009) do not consider capital accumulation and factor price e⁄ects of pension systems.
Instead, they focus on the implications of the timing of eligibility of public pensions on the
private retirement decision and show theoretical support for the ￿ndings of Gruber and Wise
(1999, 2004), as workers endogenously retire at the earliest age at which they are eligible for
public pensions. We deviate from the existing literature in the way agents are assumed to
alter labour supply. In the existing literature, retirement is the outcome of a labour market
participation decision: either full time work or no work at all. We take a di⁄erent approach.
In the model presented below, agents choose yearly working hours, whereas the retirement
age by assumption coincides with the legal retirement age controlled by the government. We
follow this alternative approach, because this paper focuses on long run e⁄ects of the legal
retirement age. In such an analysis, we believe that the choice of yearly (intensive margin)
labour supply matters a great deal more than the choice of retirement age (the extensive
margin), with the empirical ￿ndings of Gruber and Wise in mind.
4The paper proceeds as follows. The demand side of the model is presented in the next
section which o⁄ers the basic intuition behind the results. In section 3 we specify the supply
side and calibrate the model, after which the simulation results on the socially optimal legal
retirement age are presented. Section 4 concludes and provides some suggestions for future
research.
52. THE MODEL
Consider an overlapping-generations model in which agents live for two periods. Agents,
all alike, are born at time t and work in period t (working life with length ￿t) and retire in
period t+1 (retirement with length ￿t￿￿t). The variable ￿t > 0 is exogenously determined
limit-longevity or life expectancy, since we assume a survival rate of unity between the
working life and retirement. The length of working life, ￿t; we refer to as the legal retirement
age (henceforth LRA) and we assume 0 < ￿t < ￿t: Technically, ￿t is an exogenous variable,
which we imagine to be under government control.








where the function u is assumed to be strictly concave, satisfying u00
cl ￿ 0; u > 0: 1 The
arguments c1;t and lt denote consumption and leisure in each "sub period"2 of working life.
In retirement, consumption and leisure in each sub period are denoted by c2;t+1 and le:3
During working life, agents divide their time endowment between work (nt) and leisure (lt).
Without loss of generality, we normalise the endowment of time in each sub period (le) to
unity
le ￿ 1 = nt + lt (2)
where nt is working time per sub period. Consequently, agents enjoy full time leisure in
retirement by assumption.
From the strict concavity of u and no discounting within working life (￿) and retirement
(￿ ￿ ￿), optimising agents will choose to smooth consumption and leisure perfectly during
working life as well as choosing perfect consumption smoothing in retirement. Therefore,
(1) is rewritten as
Ut = ￿tu(ct;lt) + (￿t ￿ ￿t)u(c2;t+1;le) (3)
Equation (3) reveals that lifetime utility is sub period utility in the working life and
retirement, extended by their respective length. In the terminology of Philipson and Becker
1This model follows the literature on endogenous longevity on the assumption u > 0. In this literature,
the assumption ensures that agents prefer life to death. In our model, the assumption ensures a meaningful
economic interpretation of the optimal LRA.
2We borrow this terminology from Auerbach and Hassett (2002).
3Except the state variable kt determined by savings, st, all variables are sub period variables. Since kt is
the state variable taking the economy from period t to period t+1, these two variables have to be measured
as "gross variables" , which means that st is savings of the whole working period and kt is therefore the
capital per worker employed during the whole working period (￿t).
6(1998), sub period utility can be interpreted as the quality of life and the length of working
life and retirement as the quantity of life. For a given LRA (￿t), an increased lifetime
(￿t) would at ￿rst sight increase utility with the quality of life in retirement (measured
by u(c2;t+1)). In fact, this will only be the case if agents￿income when retired is solely
comprised of public pension annuities, i.e. no private savings. Since agents have private
savings in this model, retirees would have to "stretch" their saving over a longer retirement
if ￿t increased, i.e. the quality of life would decline for a given amount of savings. However,
this is not the whole story, since agents, behaving optimally, will alter the quality of life in
the working life and retirement upon changes in ￿t (or ￿t):
In each sub period during working life, agents earn wt (1 ￿ lt), pay taxes ￿twt (1 ￿ lt)
where wt is the real wage in each sub period and ￿t is the payroll tax rate. In addition,
agents save an amount, st
￿t; in each sub period (where 1
￿t may be interpreted as the annuity
cost of savings and st is therefore "gross savings" from total working life):




During retirement, the annuity income from private savings,
Rt+1st
￿t￿￿t ; and the public pen-




+ ￿t+1 [1 ￿ lt+1]wt+1 (5)
where Rt+1 denotes gross returns to savings, ￿t+1 denotes the rate out of sub period income
of current workers (generation t + 1); transferred to current retirees (generation t) which
amounts to a public pension annuity of ￿t+1 [1 ￿ lt+1]wt+1 during retirement. We will
loosely refer to ￿t as the "replacement rate".
The population evolves according to
Nt+1 = [1 + bt]Nt (6)
where Nt is the size of generation t; and bt 2 (￿1;+1) denotes the growth rate of the
population between generation t + 1 and t: Generation t + 1 is born into working life as
generation t gives birth to Nt [1 + bt] at the end of working life. Let us here clarify the
implications on demographics from the extensive length of the two life cycle periods. For
example, if ￿(1 + m) = ￿ there would be m + 2 generations alive in period t:4 However,
since the retirees, who "unusually" survive for more than one length of working life, are
4Where m = 0 and ￿t = ￿t = 1 is the classical case. If for example m = 2, working life constitutes 1
3 and
retirement 2
3 of total life. Then it takes three working periods before the retirees are dead , and therefore
there will be four generations alive in each period t; since generation t and t￿1 live as usual, but generations
t ￿ 2 and t ￿ 3 have not died yet biologically, but only "economically".
7passive in the sense that all economic decisions have been executed, they are unimportant
for the dynamics of the economy. To avoid this problem, the existing literature dealing with
extensive length of periods usually assumes a length of the working life of unity and a length
of retirement between 0 and 1, implying a maximum lifespan of length 2. In terms of the
parameters of this model this corresponds to 1
2 ￿
￿
￿ < 1, whereas our assumptions imply
the less restrictive constraint 0 <
￿
￿ < 1.
The government runs a PAYG pension scheme which is balanced in every period





where it is assumed that 0 < ￿t < 1. Note that there is no such restriction on the replacement
rate ￿t: For example, if the length of retirement is relatively low, the bene￿t annuities
should be spread over very few years and retirees could receive more than 100 % of yearly





￿t￿1￿￿t￿1 is the inverse dependency ratio. What is distinct about this system is that
factor prices and thereby long run growth are irrelevant for balancing the pension system.
This is a way of assuming that in the long run, the increased standard of living entirely
transmits through the pension system. We assume that the PAYG system (7) is balanced
by sole adjustments of either ￿t or ￿t in response to changes in the LRA (￿t). We refer to
these stylised schemes as de￿ned contribution (DC) where ￿t = ￿ and a de￿ned bene￿t (DB)
system ￿t = ￿, where sole adjustment of either the bene￿t rate (￿t) or the contribution rate
(￿t) ensures budget balance. Consequently, we rule out combinations of the two systems.5
We restrict the analysis to changes in the LRA, which entails a changed old age depen-
dency ratio,
￿t￿1￿￿t￿1
￿t[1+bt￿1] : We should make clear that we do not analyse parametric reforms in
response to ageing, i.e. how either ￿t;￿t or ￿t should change in response to demographically
related changes in the dependency ratio (b and/or ￿). Instead, we analyse how the optimal
LRA depends on given demographic ￿gures, which is a di⁄erent exercise than to evaluate
the (transition of) di⁄erent parametric reforms responding to changed demographics.
5See for example ￿ Zamac (2007) for more on this topic.
8By inserting (4) and (5) into (3) we obtain the following unconstrained problem of an
individual born at t :
max
st;lt
U = ￿tu([1 ￿ ￿t][1 ￿ lt]wt ￿
st
￿t







The ￿rst order conditions for this problem are6
Us(s;l;￿;￿) = ￿u0
c1(c1;t;lt) + Rt+1u0
c2(c2;t+1;le) = 0 (9)
Ul(s;l;￿;￿) = ￿u0
c1(c1;t;lt)[1 ￿ ￿t]wt + u0
l(c1;t;lt) = 0 (10)
Equation (9) balances the marginal cost and bene￿t of life-cycle saving in terms of mar-
ginal utilities. Equation (10) equates the marginal loss in utility from giving up one marginal
unit of sub period consumption for sub period leisure in the working life, to the marginal
increase in sub period utility from increasing sub period leisure marginally. Although the
conditions are standard, let us point out that these conditions work in sub period variables.
We use equations (4), (5), (9) and (10) to perform comparative statics to the variables
leisure and savings, without regard for budget balance of the PAYG system. First, we show
the e⁄ects of an exogenously increased LRA. (See Appendix A for proofs of the propositions.)
Proposition 1. An increased LRA has an ambiguous e⁄ect on savings. There exists a
￿ ￿ such that @s
@￿ > 0 if ￿ < ￿ ￿ and @s
@￿ < 0; if ￿ > ￿ ￿.
The ambiguity is a result of counteracting intensive and extensive e⁄ects: as the LRA
(￿) is increased, the length of retirement decreases, which lowers workers￿propensity to save.
On the other hand, increasing ￿ provides the opportunity to work and save for a longer time,
which tends to increase savings. The net e⁄ect depends on ￿; which therefore determines
the total e⁄ect. The idea of Proposition 1 is illustrated in ￿gure 1.
6Here Ux denotes the partial derivate of U with respect to x:
9LRA
Savings Lifetime
FIG. 1 Retirement age and savings
Proposition 2. An increased LRA has an ambiguous e⁄ect on sub period/yearly labour
supply. There exists a ^ ￿ such that @l
@￿ > 0 if ￿ < ^ ￿ and @l
@￿ < 0 if ￿ > ^ ￿.
As stated in Proposition 1, workers lower savings when the LRA becomes su¢ ciently
high, implying an increased demand for leisure, i.e. lower intensive labour supply. Together,
Propositions 1 and 2 state that, given a su¢ ciently long working life ex ante, increasing the
LRA would have a negative e⁄ect on both factors of production, namely capital and labour
supply.
Proposition 3. An increase in longevity increases savings and sub period/yearly labour
supply unambigiously.
In this simple partial analysis, the intuition behind the result is straightforward: for a
constant LRA, an increase in the length of life forces the agent to save and work more to
smooth consumption over the longer life span where the additional years add entirely to
retirement.
Together, the propositions illustrate the implications of the intensive and extensive ef-
fects in the model, showing the direct and partial equilibrium impact on welfare when the
(relative) length of the two periods of the life cycle is altered. We now include the production
side to account for general equilibrium e⁄ects in the simulation results.
103. THE OPTIMAL LEGAL RETIREMENT AGE
In this section, we study the optimal LRA in a general equilibrium framework. For this
purpose we start out by presenting the production side of the economy. Next, we specify
the functional forms for the utility function and de￿ne the equilibrium of the economy, after
which the model is calibrated. Finally, we perform numerical simulations of the model to
obtain values of the optimal LRA.
The production side of the economy
We describe the production of the single consumption good by a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function, Yt = K￿
t￿1 [Nt￿t(1 ￿ lt)]
1￿￿, where we assume 0 < ￿ < 1: The variable Yt
denotes aggregate gross output (i.e. the ￿ ow of income from total working life), Kt￿1 is the
aggregate gross capital stock (i.e. the stock of capital accumulated during the entire working
period) and Nt￿t(1 ￿ lt) denotes the aggregate gross labour supply. De￿ning kt￿1 ￿
Kt￿1
Nt
and yt ￿ Yt
Nt as gross capital stock and output per worker, we rewrite the production function
into per worker units yt = [kt￿1]
￿ [(1 ￿ lt)￿t]
1￿￿. In the competitive equilibrium, factors













where Rt is the gross real interest rate, assuming complete depreciation. The variable wt is
the real wage. Market clearing conditions are given by
Kt = Ntst (13)




Nt￿1c2;t + Kt (14)
The functional form of the utility function
We specify the sub period utility function as a nested constant elasticity of substitution
function. With arguments from working lifewe we write u as:









, ￿;￿ > 0 ^ ￿;￿ 6= 1 (15)
and with the arguments relevant for retirement we write u as:









;￿;￿ > 0 ^ ￿;￿ 6= 1
The parameter ￿ > 0 denotes the constant elasticity of marginal utility. The inverse in-
tratemporal elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption is given by ￿ > 0.
11The parameter ￿ > 0 measures the taste for leisure. In retirement, agents enjoy full time
leisure by assumption, le ￿ 1.
The constant a > 0 ensures that u > 0 for all possible values of ￿ and ￿.7 This assumption
ensures that an increase in the LRA has a meaningful economic interpretation, which again
ensures that the optimal LRA has a meaningful interpretation. In other words, the quality
of life, measured as the utility levels in the two periods, is positive even if ￿ > 1. Adding
the same constant a to u in both working life and retirement has no in￿ uence on the optimal
LRA. Moreover, this constant has no e⁄ect on (sub period) behaviour, since marginal utility
is una⁄ected.
Before calibrating the model, we de￿ne the equilibrium for the economy.
The equilibrium of the economy
De￿nition 1 A competitive equilibrium of the economy is a sequence fc1;t;c2;t+1;lt;kt￿1;g
1
t=0
such that (i) c1;t;c2;t+1;lt maximises utility (8) under the periodic budget constraints
(4) and (4) where factor prices, demographic variables and the legal retirement age are
taken as given fRt;wt;￿t;￿t;btg
1
t=0, (ii) the government budget is balanced, produc-
tion factors are paid their marginal product value and market clearing conditions are
satis￿ed, i.e. (7), (11), (12), (13) and (14) hold, and (iii) k0 > 0:
Calibration
The nest structure of the utility function allows leisure and consumption in working life
to be substitutes or complements, with various intertemporal elasticities of substitution. In
the baseline simulation we choose a parameter value of ￿ = 0:9 re￿ ecting that consumption
bundles in the two periods of life are weakly substitutes. The elasticity of substitution
between leisure and consumption is two, i.e., ￿ = 0:5.
In the benchmark equilibrium, we calibrate the length of adult life to 60 years (￿ss = 60)
and working life amounts to 40 years (￿ss = 40), meaning 20 years of retirement. We
choose the replacement rate to be ￿ = 2
5. For benchmark demographics, this implies a tax
rate of ￿ = 0:2. The taste for leisure is calibrated to obtain a reasonable value (lt = 0:69
() nt = 0:31) of sub period labour supply in the benchmark equilibrium. The capital
share of output is set as is standard in the literature at ￿ = 0:3. The parameter values of
the model are summarised in Table 1.
7See Hall and Jones (2007) on this issue.
12The optimal legal retirement age:
We de￿ne the (second best)8 optimal LRA ￿￿ to be the LRA that maximises the welfare
of agents alive in the steady state of the competitive equilibrium. Let ^ U(￿) denote the
indirect utility function, in steady state
U(￿) = ￿u(~ c￿
1(￿);~ l￿(￿)) + (￿ ￿ ￿)u(~ c￿
2(￿);le) (16)
and de￿ne the optimal LRA (￿￿) as
￿￿ = argmax
￿ U(￿) (17)
where an asterisk denotes that a variable is chosen optimally according to its ￿rst order
conditions, and a tilde denotes a variable in units of labor, for example ~ k = k
￿(1￿l): Before
presenting the numerical results, let us give the basic economic intuition of the mechanisms
behind the optimal LRA. The ￿rst order condition for the optimal LRA is given by
@ ^ U (￿)
@￿






















where for simplicity ￿ = 0 (no PAYG pension system). and f(~ k) is the production
function in intensive form where f0 > 0 and f00 < 0. The ￿rst two terms are e⁄ects at
the extensive margin: retirement is replaced by time in working life. In addition the terms
in brackets are e⁄ect at the intensive margin (the quality of life). The marginal utility of
consumption in working life is a⁄ected positively, since the annuity cost of savings (expressed
by the term u0(c￿
1;l￿)
~ k
￿(1 + b) in (18)) decreases as the LRA increases. Marginal utility in
retirement is also a⁄ected positively since the annuity return to savings increases as the LRA
8In the following we illustrate how ￿￿ is determined in an economy with no distortions (￿ = 0). However,
in general, in addition to these considerations ￿￿ is a⁄ected by the size and the type of the PAYG system
and therefore becomes second best optimal.
Parameters/ Benchmark Parameters/ Benchmark
Exogenous var. value Exogenous var. value
￿ 0:9 ￿ 0:4
￿ 0:5 ￿ 40
￿ 0:3 ￿ 60
￿ 1:5 b 0
￿ 0:2
TABLE 1
Values of parameters and exogeneous variables




￿￿￿(1 + b). The remaining part of (18) concerns general equilibrium e⁄ects.
The net production in steady state (w) is a⁄ected in two ways as ￿ increases. At impact,
the labor input increases tending to decrease w: However a longer working life may increase
savings (see Proposition 1). The stronger e⁄ect determines the sign of ["k￿ ￿ 1] and thereby
the net e⁄ect on the capital labor ratio and w: Therefore, in a dynamic e¢ cient economy
"k￿ > 1 ensures a positive value in the brackets of (18)
In addition to these e⁄ects, the simulations below takes into account the distortionary
e⁄ects of the PAYG pension schemes. From (7) we have @￿t
@￿ < 0 for a DB system and
@￿t
@￿ > 0 for a DC system. Hence, in a DB (DC) system, increasing (decreasing) the LRA
lowers the distortionary e⁄ects from the pension system. Together, all these e⁄ects determine
the optimal LRA. To see the total e⁄ect we now run numerical simulations.
Numerical simulation
To perform the simulations, we follow the approach suggested by Boucekkine (1995) for
saddle-point trajectories of non-linear deterministic models. This is done in the program
Dynare (Juillard, 1996). This allows us easily to check whether the simulated steady states
are locally stable. All steady state values in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix B represent locally
stable steady states.
The ￿rst row of Table 2 reports steady state values for the benchmark equilibrium, where
￿ is exogenously set to the value 40, implying that ￿ is not optimally set in accordance with
(17). The benchmark equilibrium comprises a PAYG pension replacement rate of ￿t = 0:4
and a tax rate, ￿t = 0:2. In the benchmark case we ￿nd a capital output ratio of k
y = 0:17.
In the subsequent rows we obtain the optimal LRA using (17). In Table 2 column 2 we
obtain the optimal LRA for three cases: a DC system (scenario 1), a DB system (scenario
2) and a laissez faire economy without any pension system (referred to as scenario 3, or the
￿rst best solution).9 The two ￿rst scenarios are directly comparable with the benchmark
equilibrium, whereas scenario 3 di⁄ers by de￿nition from the benchmark by not featuring
the pension system. Firstly, welfare is strictly larger when the LRA is adjusted according to
(17), i.e. there is a steady state welfare gain by adjusting the LRA independent of how the
pension system operates. Secondly, a DB system implies higher optimal LRA than a DC
system. This occurs because a DB system allows for a lower tax rate as the LRA is increased.
Therefore, a relatively long working life stimulates savings and labour supply because this
9By de￿nition, there is no pension system in the laissez faire economy and our story about retirement
being driven by the legal retirement age is not valid in such a setting. Alternatively, one could think of ￿ as
a mandatory retirement age where the government forces workers to leave the workforce at age ￿:
14lowers the tax rate and thereby the distortionary e⁄ects from the pension system. For a
DC system the opposite holds. The tax rate is ￿xed and therefore the pension annuity rate
increases as the length of retirement decreases or equivalently the LRA increases. Hence,
relatively long retirement and a short working life stimulates savings the most, because this
lowers bene￿t annuities and thereby the distortionary e⁄ects from the pension system since
lower bene￿t annuities means less private saving is depressed. The fact that adjusting the
LRA can reduce the distorting e⁄ects from the pension system explains why the optimal
LRA in the ￿rst best solution is in the middle of scenarios 1 and 2. We summarise these
simulation results below:
Simulation result 1 There exists an optimal LRA. A pension system of the DB type im-
plies that the optimal LRA is higher compared to the ￿rst best solution. A pension
system of the DC type implies that the optimal LRA is lower compared to the ￿rst best
solution. Of the second best solutions, steady state welfare is strictly higher in a DC
system.
It is worth mentioning that intensive labour supply is higher (leisure lower) in a DC
system compared to a DB system with the same benchmark, even though the tax rate
maintains its benchmark value in the DC system, whereas the tax rate (and thereby the price
on leisure) is lowered in the DB system as the LRA is increased to its optimal value. This is
in line with Proposition 2. Additionally, when the tax rate and the LRA are linked through
the budget balance of pension system, this can explain why we do not observe sensitivity of
labour supply to pay roll taxes. Take the projected pressure on unfunded pension system
caused by increasing old age dependency ratios as an example. With unchanged bene￿t
annuities and no issuing of government debt, a constant LRA necessitates rising taxes and
vice versa. If payroll taxes are gradually increased to cope with increasing longevity and a
constant or even decreasing LRA, yearly labour supply may be left una⁄ected. Even though
the lower price on leisure tends to decrease yearly labour supply a longer retirement period
tends to increase yearly labour supply, since workers have the same number of years to work
and save in but for a longer life span.
From (2b)-(2d) in Table 2 we observe how the optimal LRA is a⁄ected by di⁄erent
changes in demographic characteristics. Welfare in the second best solution is strictly higher
in the DC system. Hence, the choice of DB versus a DC system with respect to long run
welfare should not depend on long run demographic trends. This result is a consequence of
the restricted choice of either keeping bene￿ts or payroll taxes unchanged. If this is the choice
politicians face then, in the long run, distortions from the pension system can be diminished
15the most by keeping payroll taxes unchanged. The optimal LRA in the DC system implies a
relatively short working life and relatively long retirement life. The short working life entails
lower and thereby less distorting payroll tax. As indicated, workers care less about taxes as
the working years shrink. Furthermore, longer retirement promotes savings for two reasons
in a DC system: i) a longer retirement period induces, all things being equal, more private
savings and ii) the DC system implies lower bene￿t annuities implying less displacement of
private savings. The counteracting e⁄ect is of course that less income is earned, all things
being equal, as the length of working life shrinks.
As expected, we ￿nd that the optimal LRA rises with longevity (see (2d)). Moreover,









￿ t 0:68). In (2b)-(2c) we also see that a lower population
growth rate increases the optimal LRA. We summarise these simulation results below.
Simulation result 2 There exists an optimal length of working life relative to total lifespan,
for a given population growth rate and pension system. This implies that the LRA
should be raised equiproportionally with increased life expectancy if the LRA is set
optimally ex ante. Of the second best solutions, steady state welfare is strictly higher
with a DC type pension system independently of demographics.
Table 3 o⁄ers a sensitivity analysis of these abovementioned results. Let us brie￿ y
comment on them. Increasing the taste for leisure (￿) implies a lower optimal LRA. Since
leisure, per de￿nition, is full time after agents have retired, the quality of life is increased
the most in retirement if ￿ is increased. Intuitively, the optimal LRA is decreasing in the
preference for leisure. In Table 3 (b) we observe that the optimal LRA is decreasing in ￿.
However, the simulation results regarding the optimal LRA are not sensitive to variation in
this parameter. Finally, in Table 3 (c), we ￿nd that the optimal LRA is increasing in ￿. We
￿nd the optimal LRA to be sensitive to variation in this parameter and the welfare result
in Simulation result 1 can be reversed. However, a necessary condition for this to happen is
￿ > 1; which implies a negative relation between the real wage and labour supply (per sub
period). If this is the case, the steady state welfare of the second best solutions is higher in
a DB type pension system, and therefore reverses the welfare result. We sum up as follows:
Simulation result 3 Increasing the taste for leisure lowers the optimal legal retirement age.
The optimal legal retirement age is not very sensitive to variation in the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. However, the optimal legal retirement age is sensitive to
variation in the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption and the
welfare result in the second best solution can be reversed.
16To summarise, the optimal LRA depends on demographics and social security. A DC
(DB) system always implies an earlier (later) optimal LRA compared to the ￿rst best solu-
tion, since this will diminish the distorting e⁄ects from the pension system the most. For
most reasonable parameter values, steady state welfare in the second best solution is higher
with a DC-PAYG system. We ￿nd that there exists an optimal relative LRA (relative to
the length of life, i.e.
￿t
￿t). Therefore, the LRA should, all things being equal, be increased
equiproportionally with increased longevity, given that the LRA was set optimally ex ante.
174. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied the long run macroeconomic e⁄ects of the legal retirement age (LRA)
in an overlapping generations model where the government is able to control when people
retire. The main ￿ndings are the following. Alterations of the LRA for the purpose of
increasing the workforce have counteracting e⁄ects on the yearly labour supply. This result
is explained as follows: i) if workers work for more years they need to work less per year
to earn the same lifetime income and ii) the payroll tax ￿nancing public pension annuities
become increasingly distorting as the length of working life increases. This illustrates that
the LRA has important long run welfare implications and we show that an optimal relative
LRA exists (relative to the total length of life). The optimal LRA is characterised by
diminishing the distortions on labour supply and savings from unfunded public pension
systems of the PAYG type. Regarding increasing longevity, in the long run, the LRA should
be indexed to total length of life if the LRA is set optimally ex ante. If the payroll taxes
are held constant at the present level, it may be a good strategy not to increase (or at
least modestly increase ) the LRA in response to increasing longevity. The most important
welfare improving e⁄ect from such a policy is that increased longevity will imply a lower
public pension annuity rate in the future (when the payroll tax rate is held constant), which
promotes capital accumulation. In short, we have shown that besides coping with the future
budget balance of unfunded pension systems, the LRA can be utilised to increase long run
welfare compared to a given benchmark level of payroll taxes and bene￿t annuities.
Our results rely heavily on the assumption that the government perfectly controls when
workers leave the workforce. A natural extension would be a privately decided retirement
age. In such an analysis, it will be appropriate to allow for variations in the design of
pension systems, for example by a closer link between individual contributions and bene￿t,
i.e. elements of what is known as a Bismarckian pension scheme. Another decisive element
for retirement decisions is of course morbidity, the risk of death and health in general, which
also are increasingly important regarding public program expenditures on the elderly. In
other words, to study the private retirement decision and its long run implications, actuarial
design and eligibility conditions of the pension system together with heterogeneous health
conditions of workers and retirees would be key elements.
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20Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
From maximisation we have (we leave out the time notation for simplicity)
Us(s;l;￿;￿) = ￿u0
c1(c1;l) + Ru0
c2(c2) = 0 (19)
Ul(s;l;￿;￿) = ￿u0
c1(c1;l)(1 ￿ ￿)w + u0
l(c1;l) = 0 (20)
Where c1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ l)w ￿ s
￿ and c2 = Rs
￿￿￿ + ￿w(1 ￿ l)







To allow the problem to have a unique solution, we assume the Hessian of U to be a negative
de￿nite. That is, jUssj < 0 and jHj > 0. (or UllUss ￿ U2







Uls = Usl = u00
c1c1w(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ u00
c1l < 0
Ull = u00
c1c1 ((1 ￿ ￿)w)
2 ￿ u00
































































Notice that jHj > 0, so the sign of @s
@￿ is determined by the sign of the determinant in the





































21The sign of (24) is ambiguous. However, observe that as ￿ approaches ￿ (i.e. later retire-
ment) the sign of @s
@￿ tends to be negative. Because as ￿ approaches ￿, the term ￿
2+￿2￿2￿￿
















































The sign of (25) is ambiguous. However if we rewrite (25) as
￿1 z }| { ￿





















If this expression is true, then @l
@￿ > 0. We now observe the following; ￿1 is always positive
(given our assumption ￿ > ￿) and as ￿ approaches ￿ the term ￿2 goes to zero. So in this
case (26) holds with inequality. Moreover for ￿ ￿ 1 the term ￿2 becomes nonpositive. In




Proof of Proposition 3:















The determinant in the numerator is then given by UlsUl￿ ￿ UllUs￿. Further observe that






c2c2 < 0 andUll < 0 (from Appendix A).Thus, UlsUl￿ ￿
























So increasing longevity lowers the demand for leisure and thereby increases labour supply.
234.1. Appendix B
Deriving the ￿rst order condition for the optimal legal retirement age.
With ￿ = 0 (i.e. no PAYG system) the indirect utility function, ^ U , in the steady state
is given by
^ U (￿) = ￿u([1 ￿ l￿]w ￿
s￿
￿







where an asterisk l￿ ( s￿) indicates that leisure (savings) is chosen optimally according to its
￿rst order conditions. For notational ease, let f(~ k) be the production function in intensive













< 0. The real wage and













The capital market equation reads
[1 + b]~ k = ~ s￿
Substituting these condition in (27) gives the indirect utility function per worker in steady
state as a function of ~ k
^ U (￿) = ￿u([1 ￿ l](f(~ k) ￿ ~ kf0(~ k)) ￿ (1 + b)~ k[1 ￿ l]);l) + [￿ ￿ ￿]u
 
f0(~ k)~ k[1 ￿ l]￿(1 + b)
￿ ￿ ￿
!
where k is an implicit function of ￿:
The ￿rst order condition reads
@ ^ U (￿)
@￿

























k(￿):Concavity of ^ U wrt. ￿ ensures a maximum.
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24Retire- RR/ Steady Steady Steady Steady
ment tax state state state state
age rate leisure capital output welfare
￿  =￿ l k y U





(2a.1) DC-PAYG 30 0.2/0.2 0.62 1.31564 5.91 608.99
(2a.2) DB-PAYG 41 0.4/0.18 0.69 0.96 5.88 608.16




(2b.1) DC-PAYG 32 0.18/0.2 0.63 1.62 6.50 608.77
(2b.2) DB-PAYG 46 0.4/0.17 0.70 1.09 6.42 607.51




(2c.1) DC-PAYG 29 0.22/0.2 0.62 1.11 5.52 609.24
(2c.2) DB-PAYG 38 0.4/0.18 0.68 0.85 5.53 608.73
NoPAYG 35 0/0 0.57 1.78 7.96 610.34
(2d) Longevity:
￿ = 70
(2d.1) DC-PAYG 35 0.2/0.2 0.62 1.53 6.90 710.49
(2d.2) DB-PAYG 48 0.4/0.18 0.69 1.12 6.88 709.52
(2d.3) No PAYG 43 0/0 0.57 2.49 10.03 712.20
TABLE 2
Optimal retirement age and steady state values. RR: replacement rate
25Retire- RR/ Steady Steady Steady Steady
ment tax state state state state
age rate leisure capital output welfare






(a.1) DC PAYG 33 0.24/0.2 0.38 1.91 10.09 566.82
(a.2) DB PAYG 42 0.4/0.17 0.43 1.50 10.48 565.91
(a.3) NO PAYG 39 0/0 0.32 3.01 13.81 570.33
(b) 1/CES
￿ = 0:5
(b.1) DC-PAYG 32 0.23/0.2 0.60 1.64 6.86 130.35
(b.2) DB-PAYG 42 0.4/0.17 0.66 1.34 7.05 129.81
(b.3) NO PAYG 39 0.56 2.58 9.72 131.65
￿ = 1:5
(a = 15)
(b.4) DC-PAYG 28 0.18/0.2 0.66 1.02 5.01 787.56
(b.5) DB-PAYG 40 0.4/0.2 0.72 0.65 4.76 786.37
(b.6) No PAYG 35 0/0 0.60 1.70 7.49 789.22
(c) 1/CES
￿ = 1:5
(c.1) DC-PAYG 39 0.37/0.2 0.30 2.20 12.90 460.02
(c.2) DB-PAYG 43.5 0.4/0.09 0.31 1.95 13.14 460.14
(c.3) No PAYG 43 0/0 0.31 3.57 15.70 463.91
TABLE 3
Optimal retirement age and steady state values. RR: replacement rate
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